If, for strict preferences, a unique choice function (CF) is used to aggregate preferences position-wise then the resulting social welfare function (SWF) is dictatorial. This suggests that the task performed by non-dictatorial SWFs must be “more complex” than just selecting an alternative...

For the case of two alternatives and a given finite set of at least three individuals, seven axioms are shown to characterize the rules that are either the relative majority rule or the relative majority in which a given individual, the chairman, can always break ties. An axiomatization of the...

A merging (or assessment aggregation) function (see [7]) is a rule that synthesizes several individual assessments, or numerical judgements, by creating a unique "collective" assessment. Individual i can manipulate assessment aggregation if the change in the merged assessment due to a change in...

Denicolò [2, Theorem 1] strengthens Arrow's [1, p. 97] theorem by replacing the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition by a strictly weaker one, relational independent decisiveness (RID). It is shown here that RID can be still substantially weakened. Yet, the new condition is...