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Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device
Bovenberg, A.L.; Teulings, Coen N. - 2001
and the firm can base its incentive payments on good information. Competition, however, may allow themarket and explicit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325071
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Information, evolution and utility
Swinkels, Jeroen M.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 119-142
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599367
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Information, evolution and utility
Swinkels, Jeroen M.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 119-142
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212485
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Information and targeted spending
Eguia, Jon X.; Nicolò, Antonio - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 2, pp. 373-402
We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215297
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Slow persuasion
Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 1, pp. 129-162
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question … in a dynamic model in which a `sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a … sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536988
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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325487
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A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care
Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; van der Klaauw, Bas - 2008
We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325874
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Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance
Ejrnaes, Mette; Hochguertel, Stefan - 2008
We study entrepreneurs’ behavioral responses of effort (moral hazard) to avoid business failure.This is done in the context of an unemployment insurance scheme for self-employed, wherewe estimate how much of the transition probability to unemployment can be causally attributedto being insured....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325911
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Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data
Abbring, Jaap; Chiappori, Pierre-André; Zavadil, Tibor - 2008
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex ante moral hazard) and claim (ex post moral hazard) choices and Dutch longitudinal micro data. We use the theory to characterize the heterogeneous dynamic changes in incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325921
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Firm-Specific Information and Explicit Collusion in Experimental Oligopolies
Gomez-Martin, Francisco; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2015
We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors' actions on cartel stability and firms' incentives … information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288400