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Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations

Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 853-865

We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673201

Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons

Auster, Sarah; Gottardi, Piero - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 3, pp. 927-970

We study directed search equilibria in a decentralized market with adverse selection, where uninformed buyers post general trading mechanisms and informed sellers select one of them. We show that this has differing and significant implications with respect to the traditional approach, based on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104602

Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains

Mishra, Debasis; Roy, Souvik - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 431-466

one-sided matching problem with agents having dichotomous types. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686695

Competing with asking prices

Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 2, pp. 731-770

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705187

On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions

Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 41-52

When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with … complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be … perceived as unfair since there are bidders willing to pay more than the winners' payments. Moreover, non-core outcomes render …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673080

On the existence of approximate equilibria and sharing rule solutions in discontinuous games

Bich, Philippe; Laraki, Rida - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 1, pp. 79-108

This paper studies the existence of equilibrium solution concepts in a large class of economic models with discontinuous payoff functions. The issue is well understood for Nash equilibria, thanks to Reny’s better-reply security con- dition ( Reny 1999) and its recent improvements (Barelli and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704653

On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences

Carroll, Gabriel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1275-1318

When is a mechanism designer justified in only asking for ordinal information about preferences? Simple examples show that, even if the planner's goal (expressed by a social choice correspondence, or SCC) depends only on ordinal information, eliciting cardinal information may help with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937347

Implementation with interdependent valuations

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132

Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

Bikhchandani, Sushil - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 369-393

We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702816

Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs

Zhang, Mengxi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 1, pp. 95-129

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468064