We consider four models of evolution and learning in games which rely on perturbations of payoffs, including stochastic fictitious play. In all cases, we establish global stability results for zerosum games, games with an interior ESS, potential games, and supermodular games.

We study an experimental market with an endogenous institution. In particular, the information and matching structure of the market is determined by the decisions of the individual traders. We examine the effects of the imposition of exogenous transaction (communication) costs. We find that the...

Schaffer (1988) proposed a concept of evolutionary stability for finite-population models that has interesting implications in economic models of evolutionary learning, since it is related to perfectly competitive equilibrium. The present paper explores the relation of this concept to Nash...

This paper reassesses the impact of in°ation on long-term growth for a panel of 14 EU countries. While previous research focuses on a linear nexus or allows for a piecewise linear relationship with one single threshold, we take account of a more complex relationship. We use a theoretical...

Dynamic competitive models of industry evolution suggest that firm profit will be more volatile and turnover will be lower in industries with higher sunk costs. These implications are consistent with empirical observation.