We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness.As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students....

This paper shows that neglecting fairness concerns and decision errors prevents a satisfactory understanding of how competition affects prices.

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of...

A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solelymotivated by material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs ofrelevant reference agents...

Most economic models are based on the self-interest-hypothesis that assumes that all people are exklusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and...

This paper provides an experimental evidence indicating that incentivecontracts may undermine voluntary cooperation.