In the vast majority of laboratory experiments documenting the existence of reciprocity subjects are endowed with windfall funds. In many environments with salient fairness considerations such endowments are known to inflate subjects’ other-regarding behavior, thereby creating a so-called...

We provide explicit formulas for the nucleolus of an arbitrary assignment game with two buyers and two sellers. Five different cases are analyzed depending on the entries of the assignment matrix. We extend the results to the case of 2 m or m 2 assignment games.

A multi-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible com- modities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a...

An assignment game is defined by a matrix A, where each row represents a buyer and each column a seller. If buyer i is matched with seller j, the market produces aij units of utility. We study Monge assignment games, that is bilateral cooperative assignment games where the assignment matrix...

In the vast majority of experiments documenting the existence of reciprocity subjects are endowed with windfall funds. In some situations such endowments might create a so-called “house money effect”. We identify two reasons why the source of endowment might matter for negative reciprocity:...

In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequential decision problem. In each step of the process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive...

We extend Rochfords (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise-bargained equilibrium to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to a negotiation process among all...

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of...

Cooperative TU-games with large core were introduced by Sharkey (1982) and the concept of Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme was defined by Sprumont (1990). Linking these two concepts, Moulin (1990) introduces the notion of large monotonic core giving a characterization for three-player...

We study the behaviour of the extreme points of the core of a game in front of the reduction of the game and prove that the extreme core points have the reduced game property but not the converse reduced game property. Nevertheless we give some sufficient conditions on an extreme point of the...