We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard equilibrium selection arguments either have no bite or they select an equilibrium that is not observed in...

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect publicmonitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfectBayesian Nash equilibrium ...

On financial markets many investment decisions are taken by groups and not by individuals. The evidence, however, whether groups better than individuals, is ambigous. We analyze the portfolios of groups and individuals in an asset allocation task on an experimental market. We find that groups on...

This paper argues that observations of non-stationary choice behavior need notnecessarily imply specific properties of the individual’s discount function. As weshow, the observed “anomalies” in intertemporal choice can alternatively be explained by an individual’s perception of the risk...