We study incentive-compatible labour contracts in the case where individual productivity, preference for leisure and time preference rate are unobservable by the principal in a two-period model. We first reduce this three-dimensional problem to a standard one-dimensional screening problem....

In a 2-country monetary union, this paper studies a Stackelberg game be- tween the Central Banker and two symmetrical countries. The central banker chooses the money supply. In each country, there is a union who acts as a monopoly of labor supply. Firms are wage and price takers. We analyze the...

In a 2-country and 3-period OLG model with education, we study the impact on international migration of the two sided characteristics of borders. Individuals must first "leave" their home country before "entering" the destination country. Indeed, each social planner chooses the static welfare...

Search models with wage posting and match-specific heterogeneity generate wage dispersion. Given K values for the match-specific variable, it is known that there are K reservation wages that could be posted, but generically never more than two actually are posted in equilibrium. What is unknown...

We analyse the consequences of a change of the characteristics of goods due to new information on the equilibrium of a pure exchange economy with n goods and m agents. Some changes of the characteristics of goods à la Lancaster have a positive effect on utility. In the general competitive...