This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority, or delegate it to the agent, who has better information. An outside evaluator who forms the principal's reputation cannot observe who makes the...

This paper investigates whether the rare occurrence of a local election ending in a tie or being decided by a single vote generates informational spill-overs on nearby localities’ subsequent elections. First, based on the pivotal-voter theory, we develop a model of costly instrumental voting...

This paper exploits the multi-tiered structure of personal income taxation in Italy to investigate within-tier (horizontal) and between-tiers (vertical and diagonal) fiscal externalities. Estimation of an unrestricted income tax reaction function on municipalities located at internal regional...

We study the impact of climate change on migration by developing a real options model that rigorously formalizes the trade-off between migrating early and procrastinating to learn more about the government's implementation of an adaptation policy that can effectively moderate the consequences of...

This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority and consult the agent (an expert), or delegate the authority to the agent; however, the outside evaluator cannot observe the allocation of...

This paper considers a delegated common agent who produces a public good with private information regarding his cost. We show that truthful strategies are not optimal for principals, and that the agent enjoys some rent in equilibrium. It is not always that all principals make contributions: the...