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Motivate and select : relational contracts with persistent types
Nikolowa, Radoslawa - 2014
's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics as well as the distribution of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010382180
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Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment : thirty years on
MacLeod, William Bentley; Malcomson, James M. - 2023
with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013500553
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Strategic Priorities, Relational Contracting Clarity and the Use of Subjectivity in Incentive Contracts
Bormann, Sara - 2015
contracting clarity. Clarity refers to the extent to which the terms of a relational contract, or subjective assessment can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036596
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On Delegation under Relational Contracts
Gürtler, Oliver - 2005
delegation with specialization, when the parties make use of both, formal and informal agreements. It is found that many of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263154
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On Delegation under Relational Contracts
Gürtler, Oliver - 2006
In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334062
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On Delegation under Relational Contracts
Gürtler, Oliver - University of Bonn, Germany - 2005
delegation with specialization, when the parties make use of both, formal and informal agreements. It is found that many of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968427
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Cooperation or Collusion? Rents in Relational Contracts for Teams
Ishihara, Akifumi - 2019
relational contract could establish cooperation through peer monitoring even under relative performance evaluation, which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863568
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Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010 - First Version: January 2002; Revised, February 2010
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensationbased and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822070
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Forgiveness in vertical relationships : incentive and termination effects
Vanneste, Bart S.; Frank, Douglas H. - In: Organization science : a journal of the Institute for … 25 (2014) 6, pp. 1807-1822
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010463493
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Delegated Contracting
Feltham, Gerald A. - 2008
, and analyze the principal's delegation choice to authorize a senior agent to contract with a junior agent based on reports …. We consider full-commitment contracts, i.e., the principal is assured that his contract for each agent is implemented … decentralized contract are driven by their incentives to share risk, and by their incentives to re-allocate their effort choices, i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012726431