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Characterizing the incentive compatible and pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, k Items, public budget and quasilinear utilities

Lerner, Anat; Gonen, Rica - In: Games 5 (2014) 2, pp. 97-115

We characterize the efficiency space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto-optimal combinatorial auctions in a model with two players and k nonidentical items. We examine a model with multidimensional types, private values and quasilinear...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369368

Dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions

Lerner, Anat; Gonen, Rica - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 13 (2013) 1, pp. 1-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010185563

The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings

Gonen, Rica; Lerner, Anat - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 690-710

We analyze the space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto optimal combinatorial auctions. We examine a model with multidimensional types, nonidentical items, private values and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation; the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240824