This paper investigates a Cournot game model with a nonlinear demand function where a profit-maximizing firm competes against a socially concerned firm. The timing of the game is as follows. In stage one, each firm non-cooperatively decides whether to offer a wage-rise contract policy (WRCP) as...

Purpose – In recent years, an increasing interest in the participative practices of the workpeople in their companies has taken place in the European Union. Taking advantage of this situation, the purpose of this paper is to show additional evidence of the benefits from companies with majority...

This paper considers a Cournot oligopoly model with a concave demand function where socially concerned firms can offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment device. Each socially concerned firm maximizes its own profit plus a share of consumer surplus. The paper presents the reaction...

This paper considers a two-stage game model with a nonlinear concave demand function where two socially concerned firms compete with each other. In the first stage, each firm decides simultaneously and independently whether to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment device. In the...

This paper investigates a Cournot game model with a nonlinear demand function where a profit-maximizing firm competes against a socially concerned firm. The timing of the game is as follows. In stage one, each firm non-cooperatively decides whether to offer a wage-rise contract policy as a...

This paper considers a Cournot oligopoly game model with a concave demand function where socially concerned firms compete with each other. Each socially concerned firm maximizes its own profit plus a share of consumer surplus. The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, each...

This paper considers a two-stage game model with a nonlinear concave demand function where two socially concerned firms compete with each other. In the first stage, each firm decides simultaneously and independently whether to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment device. In the...

This paper considers a two-stage game model with a nonlinear concave demand function where two socially concerned firms compete with each other. Each socially concerned firm maximizes its own profit plus a fraction of consumer surplus. In the first stage, each socially concerned firm decides...

This paper examines two three-stage games with a labor-managed income-perworker- maximizing firm and a profit-maximizing firm. In the first stage, the labormanaged firm (resp. the profit-maximizing firm) decides whether to make a commitment to capacity. In the second stage, the other firm...