This articles re-examines a standard result on the demand for insurance ("full coverage with a fair premium and partial coverage with a loaded premium"') in the presence of a default risk. It is established that the optimal insurance coverage is always partial coverage if the default is total,...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to test for the existence of residual moral hazard in the three largest US reinsurance markets over the period 1995‐2000 and examine the effectiveness of retention limit, experience rating and long‐term contracting relationship in controlling for...

The foundation of insurance in the frequentist framework is well-understood by experts in actuarial science, insurance and risk management. In the past two decades there has been a surge in the application of Bayesian analysis in insurance. However, the foundation of insurance under the Bayesian...

The asymmetric information problem has been widely discussed in the context of insurance markets. Most of previous research usually treats adverse selection and moral hazard separately, though it is quite possible that they may coexist and interact with each other. In this paper, we build a...

Most of the previous research in the asymmetric information problem treats adverse selection and moral hazard separately, though they may coexist and interact with each other. We build a principal-agent model to examine optimal contracts in a competitive insurance market facing adverse selection...