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Supporting others and the evolution of influence

Barberà, Salvador; Perea, Andrés - In: Journal of economic dynamics & control 26 (2002) 12, pp. 2051-2092

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006768491

Apéndice : el papel del estado en la asignación de recursos. Algunas recomendaciones desde la teoría económica

Barberà, Salvador - In: El sector público en las economías de mercado : …, (pp. 139-161). 1979

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001867492

The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies

Herings, P.; Predtetchinski, A.; Perea, A. - In: International Journal of Game Theory 34 (2006) 1, pp. 55-65

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375664

The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies

Herings, P.J.J.; Predtetchinski, A.; Perea, A. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 34 (2005) 1, pp. 55-66

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006123196

Lexicographic probabilities and rationalizability in extensive games

Asheim, G.B.; Perea, A. - Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652424

Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games

Perea, Andres; Peters, Hans; Schulteis, Tim; Vermeulen, … - In: International Journal of Game Theory 34 (2006) 4, pp. 457-473

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375713

A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games

Perea, Andres - In: Games and Economic Behavior 40 (2002) 2, pp. 322-338

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408645

Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility

Muller, Rudolf; Perea, Andres; Wolf, Sascha - In: Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007) 2, pp. 344-358

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408950

Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games

Asheim, Geir B.; Perea, Andres - In: Games and Economic Behavior 53 (2005) 1, pp. 15-42

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413454

Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games.

Schulteis, Tim; Perea, Andres; Peters, Hans; Vermeulen, … - Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), … - 2004

In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2003) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011202008