This paper studies implicit pricing of non-wage job characteristics in the labour market using a two-sided matching model. It departs from the previous literature by allowing worker heterogeneity in productivity, which gives rise to a double transaction problem in a hedonic model. Deriving...

We estimate the causal effects of childcare availability on the maternal employment rate using prefecture panel data constructed from the Japanese quinquennial census 1990-2010. We depart from previous contributions by controlling for prefecture fixed effects, without which the estimates can be...

This paper constructs and estimates a model of strategic wage bargaining with on-the-job search to explore three different components of wages: general human capital, match-specific capital, and outside option. As the workers find better job opportunities, the current employer has to compete...

This paper constructs and structurally estimates a dynamic model of occupational choice where all occupations are characterized in a continuous multidimensional space of skill requirement using the data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the NLSY79. This skill space approach allows...

How did skilled-biased technological change affect wage inequality, particularly between men and women? To answer that question this paper constructs a task-based Roy model in which workers possess a bundle of basic skills, and occupations are characterized as a bundle of basic tasks. The model...

We consider a model where multiple principals repeatedly offer short-term contracts to three or more agents with private information. Under low discounting there exists a simple class of mechanisms that sustains all equilibrium allocations that could be generated by arbitrarily complex...

This paper studies competition among multiple sellers in frictional markets. Ex-post equilibrium is tractable in terms of market information revelation. Applying the sufficient condition for equilibrium robustness (with respect to a seller's deviation to any arbitrary selling mechanism) to...

This paper shows that a competitive distribution of auctions (Peters, 1997) is robust to the possibility of a seller's deviation not only to a direct mechanism, but rather to any arbitrary mechanism. It characterizes equilibrium allocations that are not only robust but also independent of market...

This paper studies how implicit collusion may take place through simple non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection when multiple buyers (e.g., entrepreneurs with risky projects) non-exclusively contract with multiple firms (e.g., banks). It shows that any price schedule can be supported...