In this paper, transaction costs in the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) are examined empirically based on survey data from German companies. Transaction costs from measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions, permit trading and general informational costs are considered....

Agri-environmental schemes are the main policy instrument currently available in the European Union to promote environmentally friendly farming practices. Nevertheless, the adoption rate of these measures is still limited. This paper develops a profit maximizer theoretical framework to explain...

In this paper we empirically compare the transaction costs from monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of two environmental regulations directed to cost-efficiently reduce greenhouse gas emissions: a carbon dioxide (CO2) tax and a tradable emissions system. We do this in the case of...

Síntesis Salaverry es un pequeño puerto localizado a pocos kilómetros de la ciudad de Trujillo, al norte del Perú. Moviliza alrededor de 2.5 millones de toneladas de carga al año, en su mayoría, granel seco. Desde 1982, ENAPU, la empresa estatal que opera el puerto, ha venido reduciendo...

In this paper we empirically compare the transaction costs from monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of two environmental regulations directed to cost-efficiently reduce greenhouse gas emissions: a carbon dioxide (CO2) tax and a tradable emissions system. We do this in the case of...

This chapter of the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law %u2013 the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of our...

In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for analysis of mechanisms of governance of agro-ecosystem services. Firstly, we...

The authors construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative externality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. The authors analyze...

A model of externalities with sequential location choice is developed. The first mover decides on location before it knows the identity of the second mover. Joint location results in a negative externality. The court, having limitd information, allocates property rights over the externality...