We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on "naked exclusion". Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates...

We consider a vertically related industry and analyze how the total harm due to a price increase upstream is distributed over downstream firms and final consumers. For this purpose, we develop a general model without making specific assumptions regarding demand, costs, or the mode of...

type="main" <p>In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley [1991] and Segal and Whinston [2009b], we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab, and whether it is cheaper for the incumbent than simultaneous contracting. We find...</p>

We provide supporting evidence from the laboratory for the Nash predictions of the homogeneous-good Bertrand model under asymmetric constant unit costs.

We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on "naked exclusion.'' Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates...

We consider a vertically related industry and analyze how the total harm due to a price increase upstream is distributed over downstream firms and final consumers. For this purpose, we develop a general model without making specific assumptions regarding demand, costs, or the mode of...

We analyze the incidence and welfare e¤ects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We nd, in line with economic theory, that rms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human...

JEL classifications: C92; D44; J31; D72; D82;