Showing 1 - 10 of 17
In fiscal federal systems, local public works that generate spillovers are often financed by transfers from higher levels of government. In this article, we consider a governmental hierarchy composed by a Federal and a Local Government. The former delegates to the latter the task of finding a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669508
This paper formalises a three-tier administrative hierarchy. A benevolent federal government must decide how to fund an indivisible local public work, planned to be undertaken by a single firm. But the federal government observes neither the cost nor the local benefit of the project. To obtain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639393
A hierarchical model of collusion in local public works is presented. A local authority plans to undertake a project, delegating its construction to a construction firm. Both of them know the project's cost. However, the federal government decides whether to subsidize the project without knowing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005384907
This article analyses hard and soft budget constraints in a federation, where there is a moral hazard problem between the central and the regional governments. Regional governments can avoid a bailout from the center by exerting costly effort. In this setting, a hard budget constraint is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005400929
We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011073502
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006648726
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006020287
A country consists of two non-overlapping regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. If the facility is constructed, it generates a social value in the host region and has spillover effects in the rest of the country. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008533
The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of the enforcement level of indirect taxation in a positive setting. We build a sequential game where individuals differing in their willingness to pay for a taxed good vote over the enforcement level. Firms then compete à la Cournot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666843
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552557