We examine the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and information asymmetry in the equity market around quarterly earnings announcements. We use the change in market liquidity (i.e., bid-ask spreads and depths) around the announcements as a proxy for information asymmetry....

We investigate the relations between changes in the precisions of public and private information and changes in market liquidity around earnings announcements. Increases in the precision of public information reduce information asymmetry, whereas increases in the precision of private information...

This study investigates whether bank managers use their discretion in estimating loan loss provisions to convey information about their banks' future prospects. Bank managers' propensities to signal their private information vary cross-sectionally because they face different conditions and have...

This study investigates the implications of bank managers' discretion over their loan loss provision. It empirically assesses whether discretionary loan loss provision contains both signaling and income smoothing components. To do so, the study identifies different environments in which either...

We investigate the relation between the proportion of total compensation received by CEOs from stock options and the accuracy and bias of analysts' earnings forecasts. We hypothesize that forecast accuracy decreases as the proportion of stock option pay increases. Higher proportions of stock...

We study the relationships between three variables which proxy for the ex-ante level of information asymmetry - forecast dispersion, forecast revision volatility, and the level of analyst coverage, and equity bid-ask spread and depth changes around quarterly earnings releases. Kim and...

We examine whether and how managers use loan loss provisions to smooth income and to signal their private information about their banks' future prospects. Our paper highlights that the use of the loan loss provision to accomplish more than one objective gives rise to situation-specific costs and...

This study investigates whether bank managers use their discretion in estimating loan loss provisions to convey information about their banks' future prospects. Bank managers' propensities to signal their private information vary cross-sectionally because they face different conditions and have...

We examine how auditor reputation conditions the market valuation of banks' loan loss provision (LLP). The inherent uncertainty associated with and discretion permitted in estimating the LLP contributes to information asymmetry. The auditor's certification and monitoring roles influence firm...