We introduce tests for finite-sample linear regressions with heteroskedastic errors. The tests are exact, i.e., they have guaranteed type I error probabilities when bounds are known on the range of the dependent variable, without any assumptions about the noise structure. We provide upper bounds...

We consider the "and" communication mechanism that inputs messages from two players and outputs the public signal "yes" if both messages are "yes", and outputs "no" otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented through finite or infinite repetition of this mechanism.

Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol as a protocol from which no individual may...

This paper studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponent's. We characterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an explanation phase is followed by a...

It is well known that, whereas in one-agent contexts the value of information is always positive, in strategic situations, this is not always the case. We will consider the class of games for which, under a specific information structure, there exists a unique Pareto payoff profile, and we show...

We characterize the max min of repeated zero-sum games in which player one plays in pure strategies sonditional on the private observation of a fixed sequence random variables. Meanwhile we introduce a definition of a strategic distance between probability measures, and relate it to the standard...