This paper reports the theoretical and experimental results of auctions for public construction in which firms cut corners. We show that the winning bids and the winner's quality choices of the constructed buildings are both zero in equilibria if there are at least two firms whose initial cash...

This paper proposes an integrated analytical framework consisting of the following three steps: (1) investigation of consumers’ preferences, (2) prediction of technology diffusion by taking into account consumers’ preferences, and (3) estimation of CO2 emission reduction caused by the...

TThis paper explores national identity in trust and reciprocity at theintra- and international levels by adopting a modified trust game played among groups from Austria and Japan, in which subjects play the roles of trustor and trustee consecutively without any information feedback. Intra- and...

This paper explores national identity in trust and reciprocity at the intra- and international levels by adopting a modified trust game played among groups from Austria and Japan, wherein subjects play the roles of trustor and trustee consecutively without any information feedback. Although the...

We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that a government distributes...

We consider the problem of choosing an allocation in an economy in which there is one private good and one public good. Our purpose is to identify the class of procedures of choosing an allocation which satisfies "strategy-proofness," "individual rationality," "no exploitation" and...

We consider the problem of choosing an allocation in an economy in which there are one private good and one public good. Our purpose is to identify the class of procedures of choosing an allocation which satisfy "strategy-proofness," "individual rationality", "no exploitation" and...

For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This result demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict...

We search for impartiality in the allocation of objects when monetary transfers are not possible. Our main focus is anonymity. The standard definition requires that if agents' names are permuted, their assignments should be permuted in the same way. Since no rule satisfies this definition in...