In Poisson games, an extension of perfect equilibrium based on perturbations of the strategy space does not guarantee that players use admissible actions. This observation suggests that such a class of perturbations is not the correct one. We characterize the right space of perturbations to...

In Poisson games, an extension of perfect equilibrium based on perturbations of the strategy space does not guarantee that players use admissible actions. This observation suggests that such a class of perturbations is not the correct one. We characterize the right space of perturbations to...

We present a model where a society elects candidates belonging to two parties to a national parliament. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. The policy outcome is a function of the number of seats the two parties win in the election. We analyze two...

We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultane- ous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by ma- jority rule in a local district. The policy to be...

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under proportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the...

In this paper we show in the context of voting games with plurality rule that the "perfect" equilibrium concept does not appear restrictive enough, since, independently of preferences, it can exclude at most the election of only one candidate. Furthermore, some examples show that there are...

We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus...

Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy...