We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple technology. Efficiency and time consistency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In addition, we consider the equity axioms Suppes-Sen,...

Ferejohn and Page transplanted a stationarity axiom from Koopmans' theory of impatience into Arrow's social choice theory with an infinite horizon and showed that the Arrow axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. We prove that the negative implications of their...

Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms. We introduce a concept of norm-conditional...

In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that Arrow's axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto...

This note provides an alternative proof of a known result on the existenceof collections of orderings generating intersection quasi-orderings. Instead of proving theresult from rst principles, it is illustrated how it can be obtained by making use of ananalogous relationship between partial...

Discounting the utilities of future people or giving smaller weights to groups other thanone's own is often criticized on the grounds that the resulting objective function diers fromthe ethically appropriate one...

Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that thereare several possible states of nature, each of which is identied with abargaining problem...

This paper provides an analysis of individual and social decision criteria foralternatives that are composed of several attributes. We derive additive and multiplicativecriteria for individual decision-making with new axioms and apply these criteria toobtain new justications of known social...

In pure population problems, a single resource is to be distributed equally among the agents in a society, and the social planner chooses population size(s) and per-capita consumption(s) for each resource constraint and set of feasible population sizes within the domain of the solution. This...