In a market with stochastic demand with seller competition at most one seller can acquire costly information about demand. Other sellers entertain idiosyncratic beliefs about the market demand and the probability that an informed seller is trading in the market. These idiosyncratic beliefs...

Individuals differ in behavior since neither their ethical constraints, their attitudes towards risk, nor their analytical talents are the same. In an experimental prephase we tried to elicit such differences by confronting participants with suitable one-person-decision problems. In the main...

When people decide about saving and consumption across the various periods of their life time they take into account their life expectancy when comparing present and future needs and resources for satisfying them. The experimental design, applied at two sites (Humboldt-University at Berlin and...

During the last three decades the ascent of behavioral economics clearly helped to bring down artificial disciplinary boundaries between psychology and economics. Noting that behavioral economics seems still under the spell of the rational choice tradition and, indirectly, of behaviorism we...

When people decide about saving and consumption across the various periods of their life time they take into account their life expectancy when comparing present and future needs and resources for satisfying them. The experimental design, applied at two sites (Humboldt-University at Berlin and...

Individuals differ in behavior since neither their ethical constraints, their attitudes towards risk, nor their analytical talents are the same. In an experimental prephase we tried to elicit such differences by confronting participants with suitable one-person-decision problems. In the main...

This paper analyses individual information acquisition in an ultimatum game with a-priori unknown outside options. We find that while individual play seems to accord reasonably well with the distribution of empirical behavior, contestants seem to grossly overweigh the value of information. While...

In the Yes/No game, like in the ultimatum game, proposer and responder can share a monetary reward. In both games the proposer suggests a reward distribution which the responder can accept or reject (yielding 0-payoffs). The games only differ in that the responder does (not) learn the suggested...

In this note we establish that rational demand expectations will typically not evolve in an evolutionary model. In an evolutionary model, beliefs act like a commitment device to more aggressive behavior. This commitment effect has the same direction for strategic substitutes and complements and...