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Competitive preferences and status as an incentive: Experimental evidence

Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2010

be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277030

Competitive preferences and status as an incentive : experimental evidence

Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2010

be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to … ; experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003985726

The economics of credence goods: on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009

inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271236

The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009

inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294835

The economics of credence goods : on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009

inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. -- Credence goods ; experiment ; liability ; verifiability ; reputation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003814341

The economics of credence goods : on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009

inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. -- credence goods ; experiment ; liability ; verifiability ; reputation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733215

The Economics of Credence Goods : On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition

Dulleck, Uwe - 2009

inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012764487

The Economics of Credence Goods : On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition

Dulleck, Uwe - 2009

inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012764586

Heterogeneity in rent-seeking contests with multiple stages : theory and experimental evidence

Hörtnagl, Tanja; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Stracke, Rudi; … - 2013

This paper investigates how heterogeneity in contestants ́investment costs affects the competition intensity in a dynamic elimination contest. Theory predicts that the absolute level of investment costs has no effect on the competition intensity in homogeneous interactions. Relative cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199750

Heterogeneity in rent-seeking contests with multiple stages : theory and experimental evidence

Hörtnagl, Tanja; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Stracke, Rudi; … - 2013

This paper investigates how heterogeneity in contestants' investment costs affects the competition intensity in a dynamic elimination contest. Theory predicts that the absolute level of investment costs has no effect on the competition intensity in homogeneous interactions. Relative cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010194825