Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to...

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of...

A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy ellátási lánc esetében. Az ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelő ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy Arrow-Karlin típusú modellben lineáris készletezési és konvex termelési költség mellett....

We apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) supply chain. The bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer) in the framework of the HMMS-model with quadratic cost functions is considered. It is assumed that both firms minimize...

Weiss (1981) established core equivalence and the existence of competitive equilibria in finitely additive exchange economies. To underline the relevance of finitely additive economies we present in this note an example with a close connection to finite exchange economies.

Economic theories of rational addiction aim to describe consumer behavior in the presence of habit-forming goods. We provide a biological foundation for this body of work by formally specifying conditions under which it is optimal to form a habit. We demonstrate the empirical validity of our...

We use a theoretical framework to compare production-in-advance type and production-to-order type environments. Carrying out our analysis in the framework of a symmetric capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game, we prove that the equilibrium prots are the same in case of production...

In this paper cost sharing problems are considered. We focus on problems given by rooted trees, we call these problems cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called irrigation games. A formal notion of irrigation games is introduced, and the...

When modeling game situations of incomplete information one usually considers the players’ hierarchies of beliefs, a source of all sorts of complications. Harsányi (1967-68)’s idea henceforth referred to as the ”Harsányi program” is that hierarchies of beliefs can be replaced by...

The solution of a TU cooperative game can be a distribution of the value of the grand coalition, i.e. it can be a distribution of the payo (utility) all the players together achieve. In a regression model, the evaluation of the explanatory variables can be a distribution of the overall t, i.e....