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Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
Englmaier, Florian (contributor); Wambach, Achim (contributor) - 2005
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003011503
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Information, coordination, and the industrialization of countries
Englmaier, Florian; Reisinger, Markus - 2006
appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a … property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out … possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261419
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Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries
Englmaier, Florian; Reisinger, Markus - 2006
appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a … property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out … possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333827
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Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries
Englmaier, Florian; Reisinger, Markus - CESifo - 2006
appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a … property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out … possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094193
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Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries
Englmaier, Florian; Reisinger, Markus - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a … property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out … possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739668
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Information, coordination, and the industrialization of countries
Englmaier, Florian; Reisinger, Markus - 2006
appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a … property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out … possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371074
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Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim - 2005
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267400
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Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion
Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566722
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Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Inequity Aversion
Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim - 2021
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318431
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Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave
Englmaier, Florian; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2010
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822065