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Employee performance and mental well-being : the mitigating effects of transformational leadership during crisis

Czura, Kristina; Englmaier, Florian; Ho, Hoa; Spantig, Lisa - 2023

The positive role of transformational leadership on productivity and mental well-being has long been established. Transformational leadership behavior may be particularly suited to navigate times of crisis which are characterized by high levels of complexity and uncertainty. We exploit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014281431

Mapping the dynamics of management styles : evidence from German survey data

Englmaier, Florian; Hofmann, Michael; Wolter, Stefanie - 2023

We study how firms adjust the bundles of management practices they adopt over time, using repeated survey data collected in Germany from 2012 to 2018. By employing unsupervised machine learning, we leverage high-dimensional data on human resource policies to describe clusters of management...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476829

Employee performance and mental well-being : the mitigating effects of transformational leadership during crisis

Czura, Kristina; Englmaier, Florian; Ho, Hoa; Spantig, Lisa - 2023

The positive role of transformational leadership on productivity and mental wellbeing has long been established. Transformational leadership behavior may be particularly suited to navigate times of crisis which are characterized by high levels of complexity and uncertainty. We exploit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495739

Contracts and Inequity Aversion

Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim - CESifo - 2002

Using the concept of Inequity Aversion we derive in a Moral Hazard setting several results which differ from conventional contract theory. Our three key insights are: First, inequity aversion plays a crucial role in the design of optimal contracts. Second, there is a strong tendency towards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766116

Contracts and Inequity Aversion

Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim - Royal Economic Society - RES - 2003

Inequity aversion is a special form of other regarding preferences and captures many features of reciprocal behavior, an apparently robust pattern in human nature. Using this concept we analyze the Moral Hazard problem and derive several results which differ from conventional contract theory....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005232502

Contractual and organizational structure with reciprocal agents

Englmaier, Florian (contributor); … - 2008

Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that reciprocal motivations and explicit performance-based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003763282

Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries

Englmaier, Florian - 2013

appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a … property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out … possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012754358

Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers

Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Abstract We study optimal incentive provision for â€œknowledge workersâ€�, a crucial resource for many organizations. We augment a standard moral-hazard framework to reflect two key patterns: First, retention is a challenge because workers are free to leave; thereby harming their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099573

Long-Term Employment Relations when Agents are Present Biased

Englmaier, Florian; Fahn, Matthias; Schwarz, Marco A. - 2016

We analyze how agents’ present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a virtual contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a real contract which they end up...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584858

Long-Term Employment Relations when Agents Are Present Biased

Englmaier, Florian; Fahn, Matthias; Schwarz, Marco A. - 2017

We analyze how agents' present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a virtual contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a real contract which they end up...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592126