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Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

this desire conflicts with other strong motivationsa typical reaction is to trade off fairness against these other concerns …. Inequ(al)ity aversion allows capturing such trade off considerations in various ways(Bolton, 1991, Bolton and Ockenfels …, 1998 and 2000, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999,are examples).Such trade off analysis measures how far one deviates from fairness …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866826

Will banks promote trade? : Equilibrium selection for the trust game with banks

Güth, Werner; Ockenfels, Peter - 1998 - rev. version

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000168628

Will banks promote trade? : Equilibrium selection for the trust game with banks

Güth, Sandra - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000997648

Will banks promote trade? : equilibrium selection for the trust game with banks

Güth, Werner; Ockenfels, Peter - 1998 - Rev.

The Trust Game describes a situation where mutually beneficial trade is endangered by opportunistic exploitation. In … competing outcomes should be expected, i.e. whether or not banks can indeed promote trade. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578562

Satisficing in sales competition : experimental evidence

Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008655973

Satisficing in sales competition : experimental evidence

Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - 2009

In a duopoly market, aspiration levels express how much sellers want to earn given their expectations about the other's behavior. We augment the sellers' decision task by eliciting their profit aspiration. In a first experimental phase, whenever satisficing is not possible, sales choices, point...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009734685

Social learning of efficiency enhancing trade with(out) market entry costs : an experimental study

Chlaß, Nadine; Güth, Werner; Vanberg, Christoph - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004879136

Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents

Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Popova, Vera - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870887

Going on the Long Race? – Employment Duration and(De)Regulation of Experimental Stochastic Labor Markets

Berninghaus, Siegfried; Bleich, Sabrina; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long{term employment is risky, withthe risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long{term employment can result either from oering long{term contracts or from repeatedlyand mutually opting for rematching....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022170

Intra-firm Conflicts and Interfirm Competition

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

We study interaction effects between intra-firm conflicts and interfirm competitionon a duopolistic market with seller firms employing one or more agents and imple-menting tournament incentives. We show that inter-firm competition leads to higherincentive intensity, higher efforts and output...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866426