We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-term reversal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes beauty contest. In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the asset market. The actual price movement is determined by average market orders and...

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard equilibrium selection arguments either have no bite or they select an equilibrium that is not observed in...

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect publicmonitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfectBayesian Nash equilibrium ...

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard equilibrium selection arguments either have no bite or they select an equilibrium that is not observed in...

We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-termreversal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes beauty contest. In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the asset market. The actual price movement is determined by average market orders and...

We consider a simple CAPM with heterogenous expectations on assets mean returns while keeping the assumption of homogenous expectations on the covariance of returns. Our first result derives the security market line as an aggregation result without using the two-fund-separation property. In...