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We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labour market negotiations model (McDonald and Solow, 1981). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the two solutions together replicate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012269492
We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labour market negotiations model (McDonald and Solow, 1981). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the two solutions together replicate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828121
We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labour market negotiations model (McDonald and Solow, 1981). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the two solutions together replicate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012244506
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012508160
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014492212
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272596
In this article we combine Debreu's (1952) social system with Hurwicz's (1994, 2008) ideas of embedding a "desired" game form into a "natural" game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is "illegal" according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012606400
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011806888
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731672
In this article we combine Debreu's (1952) social system with Hurwicz's (1994, 2008) ideas of embedding a "desired" game form into a "natural" game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is "illegal" according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499554