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When Galatea cares about her reputation : how having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine

Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.; Swank, Otto H. - 2010

motivate employeeswho are driven by concerns about their reputation for being able. When employeesare driven by monetary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382589

Why are residents reluctant to consult attending physicians?

Swank, Otto H. - 2009

A physician performs two tasks: making diagnoses and determining treatments. To reduce medical error, residents are supposed to consult their supervisors when they face uncommon circumstances. However, recent research shows that residents are reluctant to do so. This paper presents a model that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378360

The consequences of endogenizing information for herd behavior

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2003

In models of sequential decision making herd behaviour occurs if the signals smart(dumb) agents receive are (un)correlated and if agents have reputational concerns. We show thatintroducing costly effort to become informed about project payoffs (i) eliminates herdbehaviour and (ii) shifts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333265

Policy makers, advisors, and reputation

Wrasai, Phongthorn; Swank, Otto H. - 2004

When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334827

Committees as active audiences : reputation concerns and information

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2018

payoffs and about his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved, even after the decision has been taken. In such … inconclusive environments, in equilibrium, a member's internal (peer) reputation is based on deliberation patterns, while member …'s external (market) reputation is based on the observed group decision. Either form of reputation concerns create strategic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895815

Vanity in politics : a problem?

Suurmond, Guido; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2002

Can vanity do any good? It may seem obvious to answer this question in the negative, as economists have shown how reputational concerns lead agents e.g. to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how proud agents may be a social blessing. An agent may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327825