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The consequences of endogenizing information for herd behavior

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2003

In models of sequential decision making herd behaviour occurs if the signals smart(dumb) agents receive are (un)correlated and if agents have reputational concerns. We show thatintroducing costly effort to become informed about project payoffs (i) eliminates herdbehaviour and (ii) shifts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333265

Committees as active audiences : reputation concerns and information

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2018

payoffs and about his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved, even after the decision has been taken. In such … inconclusive environments, in equilibrium, a member's internal (peer) reputation is based on deliberation patterns, while member …'s external (market) reputation is based on the observed group decision. Either form of reputation concerns create strategic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895815

Committees of experts in the lab

Renes, Sander; Visser, Bauke - 2018

assessments. We investigate this theory in the lab, using treatments with and without reputation concerns and with and without … their assessments less dependent on actual decisions and statements. With or without reputation concerns, for the majority …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895939

Vanity in politics : a problem?

Suurmond, Guido; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2002

Can vanity do any good? It may seem obvious to answer this question in the negative, as economists have shown how reputational concerns lead agents e.g. to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how proud agents may be a social blessing. An agent may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327825

On committees of experts

Visser, Bauke; Swank, Otto H. - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002695421

Vanity in politics : a problem?

Suurmond, Guido; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001726772

On committees of experts

Visser, Bauke; Swank, Otto H. - 2005

A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of the public. Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343285

Ergebnisse des Berliner Workshops "Unternehmensbewertung" : vom 7. Februar 1998

Kruschwitz, Lutz (contributor); … - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000988991

Miles-Ezzell's WACC approach yields arbitrage

Löffler, Andreas - 2002 - This version: July 2002

A simple counterexample shows the the widely used WACC approach to value leverage firms developed by Miles and Ezzell can create an arbitrage opportunity. The only consequence to be drawn is that their WACC approach cannot be applied under the circumstances assumed by Miles and Ezzell.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526007

WACC and a generalized tax code

Husmann, Sven; Kruschwitz, Lutz; Löffler, Andreas - 2001 - Version from 10/06/2001

We extend the WACC approach to a tax system having a firm income tax and a personal income tax of the investor as well. We use an artificial tax system incorporating most of the G-7 national tax codes as for example the classical or the imputation systems.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526011