Within the setting of two simple two-person coordination games the formation of subjective strategies is observed experimentally. Though the structure of the game is unknown players use their actions in order to coordinate on a specific equilibrium. Strategies enable them to interpret the...

This study investigates the dynamic efficiency of an emission regulation regime where companies competitively pay for emission licences. We embed the emission licence market in a Cournot model where the price of emission licences is subject to strategic tradeoff between licences and abatement...

We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is finally provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all contributions. If...

The underpricing of initial public offerings is a well-documented fact of empirical equity market research. Theories explain this underpricing with market imperfections. We study three empirically relevant IPO mechanisms under almost perfect market conditions in the laboratory: a stylized book...