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Vertical integration, raising rivals' costs and upstream collusion

Normann, Hans-Theo - 2008

This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear. As a first step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003861823

Through trial & error to collusion : the discrete case

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Joerg - 2000

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538701

Stability of the Cournot process : experimental evidence

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Joerg - 2002

We report results of experiments designed to test the predictions of the best reply process. In a Cournot oligopoly with four firms, the best reply process should theoretically explode if demand and cost functions are linear. We find, however, no experimental evidence of such instability....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539705

Two are few and four are many : number effects in experimental oligopolies

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Joerg - 2001

In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of firms in an industry. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we conduct a new series of experiments studying oligopolies with two, three, four, and five firms in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539897

Through trial & error to collusion

Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg; Normann, Hans-Theo - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580461

Do short-term laboratory experiments provide valid descriptions of long-term economic interactions? : a study of Cournot markets

Normann, Hans-Theo; Requate, Tilman; Waichman, Israel - 2013

One key problem regarding the external validity of laboratory experiments is their duration: while economic interactions out in the field are often lengthy processes, typical lab experiments only last for an hour or two. To address this problem for the case of both symmetric and asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009775683

Output commitment through product bundling : experimental evidence

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191078

The effects of private damage claims on cartel stability : experimental evidence

Bodnar, Olivia; Fremerey, Melinda; Normann, Hans-Theo; … - 2019

immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage … claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to study this issue. Firms choose whether to join a cartel, may … claims decreases cartel formation but makes cartels indeed more stable. The overall impact of private damage claims is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012021639

Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?

Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - 2014 - [Rev.] November 2014

We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups purchase inputs more economically. In a repeated game, abandoning the buyer group altogether or excluding single firms constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428107

Collusion and bargaining in asymmetric Cournot duopoly : an experiment

Fischer, Christian; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2018

In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The maximization of joint profits is implausible, players disagree on the collusive action, and the outcome is often inefficient. For the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011802796