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Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?
Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - 2014 - [Rev.] November 2014
We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428107
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Hybrid collusion : algorithmic pricing in human-computer laboratory markets
Normann, Hans-Theo; Sternberg, Martin - 2021
degree of (tacit) collusion when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm in the market delegating its decisions …)certainty about the actual presence of an algorithm does not significantly affect collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012509134
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Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments
Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - In: European Economic Review 56 (2012) 8, pp. 1759-1772
We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048634
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Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence
Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - In: Economics Letters 125 (2014) 2, pp. 223-225
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that the four-firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076534
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Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?
Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 109 (2015) C, pp. 72-84
We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190130
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Explicit vs. tacit collusion: The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments
Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), … - 2012
We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956703
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Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence
Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), … - 2014
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956705
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Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?
Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), … - 2014
We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983935
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Explicit vs. tacit collusion: The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments
Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2012
We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310323
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Hybrid collusion: Algorithmic pricing in human-computer laboratory markets
Normann, Hans-Theo; Sternberg, Martin - 2021
degree of (tacit) collusion when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm in the market delegating its decisions …)certainty about the actual presence of an algorithm does not significantly affect collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012659962