This paper develops a principal-agent model of financial contracting in which optimal contracts resemble a combination of debt and equity. When defaulting on debt, the firm is punished by disruption of external funding. Such contracts however, invite rivals to compete more aggressively to...

This paper develops a principalagent model of nancial contracting in which optimalcontracts resemble a combination of debt and equity. When defaulting on debt, therm is punished by disruption of external funding. Such contracts however, inviterivals to compete more aggressively to increase the...

In einem kürzlich erschienenen ZfB – Beitrag schlagen Förster et al. eine Vorgehensweise für dieErfassung der Zinsschranke und ihrer Wirkung auf die zinsinduzierte Steuerersparnis vor. DieserBeitrag nimmt kritisch dazu Stellung: Es wird gezeigt, dass die dort abgeleiteten Formeln für...

This article tests the modell of Brander and lewis under ertrand and Cournot competition.

We examine financial constraints and forms of finance used for investment, byanalysing survey data on 157 large privatised companies in Hungary and Poland for theperiod 1998 – 2000. The Bayesian analysis using Gibbs sampling is carried out toobtain inferences about the sample companies’...