The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter'sand the subjects' models of an experimental task can adversely aect the interpretation ofdata from laboratory experiments. We discuss why the two common experimental designs(between-subjects and within-subjects) used...

This paper compares two prominent empirical measures of individualrisk attitudes | the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery-choice task and the multi-itemquestionnaire advocated by Dohmen, Falk, Human, Schupp, Sunde and Wagner(forthcoming) | with respect to (a) their within-subject stability over time...

This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment.In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units anddecides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principalreceives two...

Bereits im Jahre 1980 wählte Horst Albach einen spieltheoretischen und experimentellökonomischenZugang zum Vertrauensproblem in der Ökonomik. Dieser Weg wird erneutbeschritten. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass neuere spieltheoretische und experimentelle Arbeitennicht nur die explanativen Grenzen des...

Two traditional assumptions in neo-classical economics have beenmaterial self-interest and (commonly known) decision rationality. Sincethere is ample contradictory empirical evidence, many recent attemptshave been made to remodel the situation so that rational behavior ismore in line with actual...

We investigate an experimental representatives' trust game which resembles trust relationships between representatives of organisations. Personality traits of subjects are elicited by a personality questionnaire (Cattell's 16 PF-R) which is well established in personnel psychology. Linking the...

In one-shot investment game experiments where each player's payo is a convexcombination of own and other's prot, trust remains unaected by the extent of interdependencewhereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it.

The present research experimentally examines the ininfluence of groupidentity on trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment,group identity is manipulated only through the creation of artificial(minimal) groups. In other treatments group members are additionallyrelated by outcome...

We compared the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum....

We investigate an experimental representatives’ trust game which resembles trust relation-ships between representatives of organisations. Personality traits of subjects are elicited by a personality questionnaire (Cattell’s 16 PF-R) which is well established in personnel psychology. For the...