This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a ”first mover advantage”. We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response...

This paper considers cooperative game theoretic settings in which forming coalitions can act as Stackelberg leaders. We de�fine a value function which modi�fies the gamma-value function (Hart & Kurz, 1983, Chander & Tulkens, 1997) by letting members of deviating coalitions move �first in...

Negli ultimi tempi, fra gli studiosi dei processi di formazione delle scelte pubbliche è in corso un interessante dibattito volto ad individuare le tecniche più appropriate per gestire in maniera efficace (ovvero in tempi rapidi e garantendo la stabilità e la durevolezza delle decisioni o...

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show...

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show...

The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from markets with concave utility functions generate totally balanced games...

The application of game theory and cognitive economy to analyze the problem of undesired location - The analysts of the processes of public bodies decision - taking have long been discussing on the establishment of proper strategies to manage "environmental conflicts" - above all the so-called...

We introduce here the second volume of the Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, by L. C. Corchón and M. A. Marini (ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, describing its main aim and its basic structure.

The proportional Shapley value (Besner 2016; Béal et al. 2017; Gangolly 1981) is an proportional counterpart to the Shapley value (Shapley 1953b) in cooperative games. As shown in Besner (2017a), the proportional Shapley value is a convincing non-linear alternative, especially in cost allocation, if...

Shapley (1953a) introduced the weighted Shapley values as a family of values, also known as Shapley set. For each exogenously given weight system exists a seperate TU-value. Shapley (1981) and Dehez (2011), in the context of cost allocation, and Radzik (2012), in general, presented a value for...