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improved to accommodate Pareto efficiency nor strategy proofness. The final conclusion is that it is better, from an efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015218455
agents that satisfies ordinal efficiency, individual rationality, and no justified envy. The analysis extend to the full … preference domain. Individual rationality, ordinal efficiency, and no justified envy conflict with weak strategyproofness …. Moreover, individual rationality, ordinal efficiency and strategyproofness are shown to be incompatible. Finally, two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015222615
The paper discusses opportunities to utilize the series of micro-blogs as provided by the Twitter in observation of opinion dynamics. The spontaneity of tweets is more, as the service is attached more to the mobile communications. The extraction of information in the series of tweets is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015224087
We apply a fallback model of coalition formation to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the seven natural courts, which had the same members for at least two terms, between 1969 and 2009. The predictions of majority coalitions on each of the courts are generally bourn out by the 5-4...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015226615
In this paper, we study the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game over early admissions plans using a many-to-one matching framework. We characterize the equilibrium strategies of each college involving its early quota out of its total capacity, and the set of admissible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015230088
We propose a model that reconciles two aspects of social capital: social capital as reciprocal sharing of favors within a selected group vs. social capital as trust that lubricates transactions in societies. The core assumption is that individuals have productive potentials, e.g. innovations,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015232723
In this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital-intern markets) with an aftermarket. We analyze the Nash equilibria of capacity allocation games, in which preferences of hospitals and interns are common knowledge and every hospital determines a quota for the regular market given its total...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015263174
We study the house allocation problem with existing tenants: n houses (stand for indivisible objects) are to be allocated to n agents; each agent needs exactly one house and has strict preferences; k houses are initially unowned; k agents initially do not own houses; the remaining n-k agents (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015265930
In this paper, we study the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game over early admissions plans using a many-to-one matching framework. We characterize the equilibrium strategies of each college involving its early quota out of its total capacity, and the set of admissible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015236307
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the deferred-acceptance algorithm for matching (i) college applicants and colleges and (ii) men and women. In the case of the latter, it produces either one or two stable matches whereby no man and woman would prefer to be matched with each other rather than with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015237695