This paper studies frequent monitoring in a simple infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length Δ. It shows that efficient strongly symmetric perfect public...

This paper studies repeated games where the time of repetitions of the stage game is not known or controlled by the players. Many economic situations of interest where players repeatedly interact share this feature, players do not know exactly when is the next time they will be called to play...

This paper studies repeated games where the time of repetitions of the stage game is not known or controlled by the players. Many economic situations of interest where players repeatedly interact share this feature, players do not know exactly when is the next time they will be called to play...

For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity...

In Hart and Kurz (1983), stability and formation of coalition structures has been investigated in a noncooperative framework in which the strategy of each player is the coalition he wishes to join. However, given a strategy profile, the coalition structure formed is not unequivocally determined....

We present an endogenous timing game of action commitment in which players can steal from each other parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie (market). We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals radically change with the number of players involved in the game. In the...

Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger�s (2004) extends Rabin�s (1993) theory of reciprocity in a dynamic sense, introducing a rule of revision for player�s beliefs. The Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium [SRE] they define can be dynamically inconsistent. In this article it is argued that such...

For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity...

This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the existing literature on learning in games, namely the absence of any empirical verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. An extension of weighted fictitious play is proposed both obeying cognitive laws of subjective...

In this paper we will solve some linear programming problems by solving systems of differential equations using game theory. The linear programming problem must be a classical constraints problem or a classical menu problem, i.e. a maximization/minimization problem in the canonical form with all...