We consider a supply channel composed of one manufacturer and two retailers. Three cases are studied. The non-cooperative one is a leader-follower relationship. The manufacturer determines his spending in national advertising and the whole sale price. Then, the retailers determine...

We consider a supply channel composed of one manufacturer and two symmetric retailers. Three cases are studied. The non-cooperation case is a leader-follower relationship. The manufacturer determines his spending in national advertising and the wholesale price. Then, the retailers determine...

Game theory is a relevant and powerful tool for analyzing strategic interactions in a supply chain in which the decision of each player affect the payoff of other players. In order to relax the classical two supply chain members’ situation to a three supply chain members’ situation and to...

In this paper, we consider a static model for advertising strategies and pricing decisions in supply chain with one monopolistic manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers. We assume an additive form of the consumer demand which is influenced by retail price and advertising. The manufacturer...

In this paper, we develop a game theoretic model for cooperative advertising in a supply chain consisting of a monopolistic manufacturer selling its product to the consumer only through competing duopolistic retailers. We consider a new form of the demand function which is an additive form. The...

We consider in this paper a duopoly competing in quantities and where�firms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. We distinguish between effort carried out to acquire first-hand knowledge (original R&D)and effort to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture part of the...

The impact of the investment in absorptive capacity on transboundary pollution is studied by considering two countries each of them regulating a firm. Firms can invest in original research and in absorptive research to lower their pollution intensity. The absorptive research enables a firm to...

We develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of R&D level,...

We develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of R&D level,...

We develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of R&D level,...