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There is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement to incentive contracting. We argue that incentive contracts and selection can be both complements and substitutes conditional on the contracting difficulty faced by the firm. We examine these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997648
We draw on a five-year longitudinal data set to investigate the influence of performance measurement in the processual dynamics of strategic change, particularly in enacting effective strategic change. Our model examines the role of performance measurement in driving strategy-consistent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828408
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012435341
There is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement to incentive contracting. We argue that incentive contracts and selection can be both complements and substitutes conditional on the contracting difficulty faced by the firm. We examine these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018288
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003866429
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014340518
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003787262
We examine whether a firm's strategic priorities influence their selection of a new CEO and what conditions enable such an appointment to add value to the firm. More specifically, this study investigates the value-adding effect when prospector firms (i.e., those pursuing a prospector-type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913538
We review empirical papers published in JAR over the past 10 years examining management accounting and control systems in organizational contexts that are complex, ambiguous and where performance is difficult to measure. These papers draw on a variety of newer economic models of organization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913611
We examine whether pay differentials between the chief executive officer (CEO) and vice presidents (VPs) can be explained by firms’ strategic priorities. We find that firms that pursue prospector-type strategies have a larger CEO−VP difference in equity compensation. We argue that such a pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013491763