Are employee selection and incentive contracts complements or substitutes?
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Abernethy, Margaret A. ; Dekker, Henri C. ; Schulz, Axel K-D. |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting research. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0021-8456, ZDB-ID 219360-7. - Vol. 53.2015, 4, p. 633-668
|
Subject: | employee selection | incentive contracting | strategy | organizational learning | volatility | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Personalauswahl | Personnel selection | Theorie | Theory | Lernende Organisation | Learning organization | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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