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During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we propose a theoretical framework casting some lights on the drawbacks of bicameral state legislatures and on the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms. In a setting where lawmakers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273815
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Henrik Enderlein, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, befürchtet, dass die Erwartungen, die mit der Wahl Barack Obamas …, Universität Heidelberg, warnt vor zu großen Hoffnungen. Für ihn ist es eher wahrscheinlich, dass »trotz der Euphorie über die Wahl …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011692845
Analysis of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union shows that there is a serious discrepancy between the voting power gradient of Member States computed by the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Given the lack of compelling arguments to choose between these indices on purely axiomatic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293717
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This paper studies a very pure form of "vote purchasing". We consider whether it may be in the interest of a party to discriminate between groups that, possibly except for size, are identical in all welfare relevant spects, i.e. the groups are assumed to have the same income, needs, etc. To...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321789
Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324884
We develop a simple two period model to study the importance of motivational differences among politicians in describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running public office. Good politicians care about policies while bad...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325404
This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model for an open economy, in which devaluations are delayed in the pre-election period so as to increase the electoral chances of the party in office. By concentrating on closed economies, previous political cycle models had overlooked the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010327028
We develop a dynamic model of political competition. Each party has a policymotivated ideological wing and an office-motivated opportunistic wing. A blockade arises if inner-party conflict stops policy implementation. We use this model to study whether early elections should be used to overcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263756