I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple...

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...

We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any...

In this paper we are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by regrouping goods in her initial endowment. We present a suitable environment in which the existence of...

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a socially designed characteristic function, which expresses the fact that coalitions allocate goods by means of random incentive compatible mechanisms. We first survey some results in...

We search for impartiality in the allocation of objects when monetary transfers are not possible. Our main focus is anonymity. The standard definition requires that if agents' names are permuted, their assignments should be permuted in the same way. Since no rule satisfies this definition in...

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...

This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory.

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium.