In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

in any which way to obtain results on the welfare properties of trade. Secondly, some matching allocation mechanisms have …This article is concerned with the welfare properties of trade when the behavior of agents cannot be rationalized by … preferences. I investigate this question in an environment of matching allocation problems. There are two reasons for doing so …

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes …. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense … and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched … pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it … creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases …

We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched … pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it … creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases …

Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some … incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their level of manipulability. This ranking sheds a new light on practical design …