Unternehmen müssen nicht immer Kollusionsabsichten verfolgen, wenn sie untereinander Informationen austauschen. Dieser Beitrag zeigt, daß bei Nachfrageunsicherheit auch strikt kompetitive Konkurrenten private Informationen bezüglich ihrer Nachfragebedingungen preisgeben. Dies läßt sich in...

This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions taken by the downstream...

This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the...

This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions of the downstream...

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of...

We show that concealing cost information is a dominant strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies. This result enables us to endogenize the number of firms in a market in terms of market size, entry costs, and unit cost uncertainty.

This paper further develops the standard modelling of information exchange between firms in the presence of demand uncertainty which applies to firms in new industries and insecure regions or markets. We replace the normal distribution of the random variables, commonly used because of its...

This paper studies repeated trade with noisy information about previous transactions. A buyer has private information about his willingness to pay, which is either low or high, and buys goods from different sellers over time. Each seller observes a noisy history of signals about the buyer's...