Similar Search Results

Monopolistic screening under learning by doing

Gärtner, Dennis - 2007

This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315563

Endogenizing private information: Incentive contracts under learning by doing

Gärtner, Dennis - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315554

Regulation of Europe's network industries: the perspective of the new economic theory of federalism

Bickenbach, Frank - 2000

The paper starts with a description of major reforms of EU policy in the network industries. Based on the normative economics of regulation, it then points out generic information and transaction cost problems of regulatory policy making. An appropriate allocation of regulatory competencies may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265451

A strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission

Mechtenberg, Lydia; Münster, Johannes - 2011

This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic … mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when … he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281512

Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

Manzano, Carolina; Vives, Xavier - 2010

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270646

Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness

Auster, Sarah; Pavoni, Nicola - 2021

consider communication between the principal and the agent after the contract is signed and the agent receives information. We … show that limited awareness of actions improves communication in such signalling games: the principal makes a coarser …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420381

Mergers between regulated firms with unknown efficiency gains

Fiocco, Raffaele; Guo, Gongyu - 2014

In an industry where regulated firms interact with unregulated suppliers, we investigate the welfare effects of a merger between regulated firms when cost synergies are uncertain before the merger and their realization becomes private information of the merged firm. The optimal merger policy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427169

Regulierung und Wettbewerb im Bereich der Netzinfrastrukturen: Begründung, Regeln und Institutionen

Bickenbach, Frank - 1999

This paper starts by analyzing the consequences that technical and economic charactcristics of network industries have for the relationship between competition and regulation in these industries. A discussion of alternative regulatory rules shows that normative regulatory economics does not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265429

Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information … by an experiment. Finally, we show how partial information transmission can lead to communication failure, and show how …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901

Why the Publication of Socially Harmful Information May Be Socially Desirable

Hahn, Volker - 2009

We propose a signaling model in which the central bank and firms receive information on cost-push shocks independently from each other. If the firms’ signals are rather unlikely to be informative, central banks should remain silent about their own private signals. If, however, firms are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753186