The voting situations at which the Borda rule or the Copeland method can be manipulated by a single voter or a coalition of voters in three-alternative elections are characterized. From these characterizations, we derive (when possible) some analytical representations measuring the vulnerability...

L’analyse théorique de la vulnérabilité des règles de vote aux comportements stratégiques montre que le caractère plus ou moins manipulable d’une règle dépend du concept d’équilibre auquel on se réfère. Une question cruciale est de savoir si l’on doit ou non tenir compte des...

Theoretical analysis of the voting rules susceptibility to strategic manipulation suggests that the choice of the best rule (the less vulnerable to manipulation) is closely related to the underlying notion of equilibrium that is used. A crucial question is to know whether or not the possibility...

In an election contest, a losing candidate a can manipulate the election outcome in his favor by introducing a weak similar candidate WSC in the choice set, the WSC b being defined as an alternative which is ranked immediatly below a in the individual preferences. We characterize the voting...

[eng] Competition between jurisdictions occurs when there exists a mobile tax base in the economy (most of the time a fixed amount of capital) and has recently been a matter of interest in economic theory. Two different approaches can be distin­guished in this literature, depending on the...

Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance...